people decide how happy they are by comparing their prosperity with that of others, the result is what Kahneman (1999) has called a hedonic treadmill, in which everyone can grow materially better off without improving subjective well-being (see also Frank, 1985; Myers, 2000) .
Moreover, research has demonstrated that the power of social comparisons extends well beyond subjective well-being. For example, Klein (1997) manipulated whether participants believed that their performance on an aesthetic judgment task was high or low and above or below average. Participants were then asked to choose between engaging in the same judgment task again -in which they needed to achieve a high absolute score to win a prize -or a chance lottery in which they could also win the prize. Those participants who were told their scores were above average were more likely to choose another trial of the task (over the chance lottery).
They appeared to have inferred that if they were better than average, their future scores would be high (in absolute terms). They did this despite the fact that rational use of the comparative feedback they received would dictate they do the opposite: Given uncertainty about how one will do in the future, knowing that one's score was far above average in the past suggests that if one's future performance regresses to the mean, it is likely to go down. Subjective evaluations of performance, likewise, were only influenced by comparative feedback. These findings, like the hedonic treadmill, suggest that comparative feedback influences judgments in contexts where it should not, normatively speaking.
Several other studies that did not explicitly manipulate comparative and absolute feedback in a crossed design have obtained conceptually similar results. Many experiments testing the self-evaluation maintenance (SEM) model show that people are more likely to define themselves according to abilities on which they are better than others than for those on which they have high absolute ability (e.g., Campbell, Fairey, & Fehr, 1986; Tesser & Campbell, 1980) . Additional work shows that social comparisons (and reactions to comparative feedback) are largely automatic (Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris, 1995; Mussweiler, 2003) , suggesting that it is cognitively effortless to apply comparative information to inferences about absolute selfstanding. All these results suggest that comparative information exerts an inappropriately large influence on absolute evaluations.
The Power of Absolute Information
On the other hand, other research appears to contradict the findings described above.
This evidence suggests instead that objective information about one's own absolute standing exerts too strong an influence on comparative judgments. For example, Moore and Kim (2003) found that people playing a competitive game were more confident that they would win the game if the task was easy than if it was difficult, suggesting they failed to adequately consider others, and instead focused myopically on their own solo performances even when explicitly asked to compare themselves with others (for similar results, see Chambers, Windschitl, & Suls, 2003; Hoelzl & Rustichini, 2005; Kruger & Burrus, 2004; Windschitl, Kruger, & Simms, 2003) . This "solo comparison effect" describes the tendency for comparative judgments to be excessively influenced by perceptions of absolute standing. Camerer and Lovallo (1999) argued that budding entrepreneurs underestimate their chances of failure because they focus on their own strengths and abilities, while failing to adequately consider the abilities of their competitors (see Absolute and Comparative Performance Feedback 6 also Greico & Hogarth, 2004; Moore & Cain, 2005) . Related work shows that people may infer their relative levels of satisfaction and happiness from their absolute levels (Klar & Giladi, 1999) .
So what are we to make of Festinger's belief in the primacy of absolute information?
Despite a wealth of research on responses to objective absolute feedback (for a review see Kluger & DeNisi, 1996) and social comparison (for reviews, see Buunk & Gibbons, in press; Suls & Wheeler, 2000) , very little research pits absolute and comparative feedback against each other in a way that allows us to compare their influences. Research on the effects of comparative feedback -as in the classic work testing aspects of social comparison theory and its descendant theories (Festinger, 1954; Suls & Wheeler, 2000) -typically does not employ designs that include both comparative and absolute feedback, and especially not both types of feedback in a crossed design. Studies concerned with the effects of absolute feedback are similarly unlikely to also manipulate comparative feedback in the same design.
Comparison of effect sizes across studies is impossible due to variation in the dependent measures employed in these studies. Dependent measures in most social comparison studies include psychic variables such as affect (Taylor & Lobel, 1989) and self-evaluations (Tesser, 1988) , with much less attention to behavioral measures. Few studies discriminate between behaviors that should be differentially influenced by absolute and comparative feedback. There is no one standard set of dependent measures of either comparative or absolute evaluation; this is a problem because evidence suggests that the effects of comparative and absolute feedback differ substantially on slightly different measures of the same construct (Klein, 2003; Moore, 2005) .
For example, Klein (1997) found that comparative feedback had a stronger effect on subjective ratings, whereas absolute feedback had a stronger effect on behavioral measures (i.e., participants' willingness to bet on their performances). Furthermore, most prior studies show effects of native beliefs about ability on judgments and decisions, rather than assessing the effects of performance feedback.
Design and Hypotheses
The obvious missing piece of this puzzle is an experiment that manipulates comparative and absolute feedback orthogonally. This paper is designed to fill this void. The inclusion of no-feedback control groups also makes it possible to determine the locus of a given effect. For example, if individuals given favorable comparative feedback behave differently than those given unfavorable feedback, it is difficult to ascertain whether the difference is due to one or both of these groups. No study has crossed relative and absolute feedback in a design that includes conditions where participants include one type of feedback and not the other (or neither type of feedback), so this important question has not been examined.
In the study reported here, we gave participants feedback about their performance on a practice test and then asked them to evaluate their performance, place bets on how well they would perform on the actual test, and estimate their likelihood of winning. We informed participants that they earned a low score (20% correct) or a high score (80%) on the practice test, or we gave them no absolute feedback at all, thereby creating a three-level manipulation of absolute feedback. Crossed with this variable, we also informed participants that their practice test score was much better than that of other students (77 th percentile), much worse (23 rd percentile), or we gave them no comparative feedback at all. Thus, there were also three levels of comparative feedback, completing a 3 x 3 factorial design. Importantly, participants placed bets (and rated the likelihood of and confidence in winning those bets) on two different outcomes. The first was an "absolute" outcome, in that the participant had to answer over 50% of the items correctly on the actual test in order to win. The second was a "comparative" outcome; in this case, participants would win the prize if their score was higher than at least 50% of the other participants. By including equivalent decisions that depended on absolute or comparative ability, it was possible to more directly assess the effects of absolute and comparative feedback on each type of decision.
Previous studies that have examined the effects of comparative feedback have often manipulated it by providing participants with feedback about their own absolute performances as well as the absolute performances of others. This sort of manipulation confounds absolute and relative feedback because participants must be given information about their own performance in Our first goal is to replicate the "solo comparison effect" observed by Moore and Kim (2003) . In other words, we expect that when participants get only absolute feedback, their comparative bets will be higher when the absolute feedback suggests good performance rather than bad performance. Thus, participants would be inappropriately using absolute information to make predictions and decisions that should only be influenced by relative feedback. We also expect to replicate the effects reported by Klein (1997) . In particular, when people only have comparative feedback, we expect them to use it when judging their absolute performance (particularly their satisfaction with that performance). In keeping with Klein's (1997) findings, we expect to find that comparative feedback only influences comparative bets, not absolute bets.
The more interesting question is how each effect is influenced by variations in the other type of feedback and whether the effects of absolute feedback or comparative feedback tend to differ in their magnitude. We can measure the magnitude by contrasting the effect sizes associated with each type of feedback. To look at the differential effects of absolute and comparative feedback, we included a wide range of variables in addition to self-evaluations and decision-making. For example, people exhibit a self-serving bias whereby they attribute successes to internal factors and failures to external factors (Mullen & Riordan, 1988) , and according to the self-evaluation maintenance model, people tend to ascribe self-importance to those characteristics on which they have favorable standing (Tesser, 1988) . Are they more likely to engage in either of these processes when receiving favorable feedback of one type (absolute or comparative)? The full factorial design of this study allows a direct examination of these questions.
Method

Participants
Participants were 415 undergraduate students at Carnegie Mellon University who participated in exchange for monetary payment.
Procedure
Upon arrival, participants were given an instruction sheet with the heading "Guessing weights" and the following instructions:
"How good are you at figuring out how much other people weigh? In this exercise, you will be shown a series of pictures of other people and your task will be to guess, within 5 pounds, how much they weigh. You will get $4 for participating in this exercise. So that you can get used to how this game works, we will first have a practice round in which you will see 10 pictures and guess the weights of those 10 people. Then you will get feedback about how you did on the practice test. Then you will take the real test."
All participants then saw the 10 practice pictures and were asked to guess the weight of the individuals in the pictures. After having taken this test, participants received feedback about their performance. In actuality, this feedback was randomly determined and was unrelated to participants' actual performance.
Experimental Manipulations
There were three absolute performance conditions. One group was told that they had answered 2 (or 20%) of the 10 items correctly (low absolute), and another group was told they had gotten 8 (or 80%) of the items correct (high absolute). A third group did not receive any absolute feedback (no absolute). Similarly, there were three comparative performance conditions; participants learned that they had scored better than 23 percent (low comparative) or 77 percent of other test-takers (high comparative), or they received no comparative feedback (no comparative). Crossing these manipulations created nine cells in a 3 x 3 between-groups design.
The order in which participants received absolute and comparative feedback was counterbalanced.
After participants had received performance feedback on the practice trials, they were given the option of betting any amount of their $4 earnings on their subsequent performance on the actual test. If they bet and won, the amount of the bet would be doubled. Half of the participants were first asked to specify an absolute bet: "To win this bet, you will need to get more than 5 of the 10 items correct. That is, your guesses will have to fall within 5 pounds of the person's real weight on more than 5 of the 10 questions. You may risk up to $2 of your $4 on this bet." Note that this score was 3 points higher than that ostensibly achieved by participants in the low absolute condition, and 3 points lower than that in the high absolute condition.
The other half of the participants were first asked to specify a comparative bet: "To win the bet, you will need to do better than average on the test. That is, you will need to score better than at least 50% of the other test-takers. You may risk up to $2 of your $4 on this bet." Again, the criterion (50%) was the midpoint between the comparative scores given to participants in the two feedback conditions (23% and 77%). After participants had made this first bet they were then invited to make the other kind of bet. Those who made the comparative bet first made the absolute bet second, and vice versa. After participants had specified both absolute and comparative bets, they were invited to bet again: After recording their bets, participants completed the remaining dependent measures.
They estimated how many of the 10 items they and the average participant in the study would answer correctly, and guessed the percentage of other participants who would have scores lower than theirs on the upcoming test. They then estimated the percentage likelihood that they win each of their bets (and were encouraged to use any number between 0% and 100%). After doing so, participants completed a series of items on 5-point scales (from "not at all" [1] to "extremely"
[5]) measuring confidence in their bets; anxiety, concern, satisfaction, and disappointment about their practice performance; interest in the task and in doing well; and beliefs about the effects of luck and skill on their performance. Finally, participants completed a state self-esteem scale (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991) with 13 items such as "I feel inferior to others at this moment" and "I feel like I'm not doing well" on 5-point scales from "not at all" (1) to "extremely" (5). Finally participants completed the actual test (which was scored by an experimenter), after which they were paid, debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.
Results
Overview
Neither the order in which participants got feedback (either absolute or comparative first)
nor the order in which participants made their bets (either absolute or comparative first) produced significant main or interaction effects, so all the results reported below collapse across order. What follows is a series of 3 x 3 between-subjects ANOVAs examining each of the key dependent variables in turn.
Bets
Time of bet (first or second bet) did not moderate the effects of absolute or comparative feedback, and first bets were highly correlated with second bets (rs = .72 and .73 for absolute and comparative bets, respectively). Thus, we computed the mean absolute bet (that is, the mean of the first and the final absolute bet) and mean comparative bet (mean of the first and the final comparative bet), and conducted analyses with these measures The bets were included in a 3 (absolute feedback: No feedback, 2 items correct, or 8 items correct) x 3 (comparative feedback:
No feedback, 23 rd percentile, or 77 th percentile) x (2) (type of bet: absolute or comparative) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA). The first two factors were between-subjects manipulations whereas the third was a within-subjects factor. Mean absolute and comparative bets are reported in Table 1 .
The ANOVA revealed a main effect of absolute feedback, F(2, 405) = 48.46, p < .0001, such that bets were highest among those informed they scored an 8, followed by those given no feedback, followed in turn by those learning they scored a 2. Tukey post-hoc tests showed that all differences among the three conditions were significant (p < .05). should expect to have a higher absolute score on the actual test than they did on the practice trial.
Finally, there was an interaction between absolute and comparative feedback (F[2, 405] = 4.55, p < .001), although it was not qualified by bet type (F = 1.1, n.s.). As shown in Table 1 , when absolute feedback was high (8), there was no effect of comparative feedback (p > .10).
When absolute feedback was absent or low (2), bets were higher when comparative feedback was high (77 th percentile) than when it was absent or low (23 rd percentile), ps < .05.
When participants did not receive comparative feedback, their comparative bets were significantly higher when they were told their score was an 8 than when it was said to be a 2 (p < .001). This suggests that, in the absence of comparative information, participants used their absolute score as cue for comparative performance -consistent with the solo comparison effect (Moore & Kim, 2003) . When participants received no absolute feedback, comparative feedback only affected absolute bets when absolute performance was poor or unknown. This finding is less consistent with that of Klein (1997) , who found that comparative feedback had no effect on betting behavior when it was objectively irrelevant.
Perceived Likelihood of Winning
Because it is conceivable that participants' bets were based on something other than their perceived likelihood of winning, we computed the correlations between perceived likelihood and amount of bet. These correlations were, of course, highly significant (rs = .70 and .72 for comparative and absolute bets, respectively, ps < .0001). The likelihood judgments were then submitted to a 3 x 3 x (2) mixed ANOVA similar to that used above for bets. Consistent with those findings, absolute feedback exerted a significant effect on perceived likelihood of winning the absolute bet (F[2, 402] = 150.79, p < .0001); as shown in Table 1 , likelihood judgments were highest in the 8 condition, next highest in the no-feedback condition, and least highest in the 2 condition (all between-groups differences were significant by Tukey post-hoc tests, ps < .001).
Absolute feedback also influenced perceived comparative bet likelihood, F(2, 402) = 8.80, p < .0001; in this case, participants thought they were more likely to win their comparative bets when they scored an 8 or received no feedback than when they scored a 2 (ps < .05).
On the other hand, comparative feedback had no effect on perceived likelihood of winning the absolute bet (F = 1.03, n.s.). As would be expected, comparative feedback affected perceived likelihood of winning the comparative bet, F(2, 402) = 68.47, p < .0001. Participants thought they were least likely to win in the 23 rd percentile condition followed by the no-feedback condition and then the 77 th percentile condition (all between-group differences are significant, ps < .05, by Tukey post-hoc tests). Although this mostly replicates the findings for bets, it is interesting that bets did not differ between the 23 rd percentile and no feedback conditions, whereas perceived likelihood did. Participants told they scored in the 23 rd percentile thought they were less likely to win than those receiving no feedback, yet the magnitude of their bets was similar.
There also emerged a significant absolute x comparative feedback interaction which was further qualified by a 3-way interaction with type of bet (Fs > 2.60, ps < .05). Because the interaction with bet type was weak and inconsistent with the lack of interaction in the analyses on actual bets, we do not discuss this finding further.
Confidence in Bets
The same 3 x 3 x (2) mixed ANOVA was conducted on participants' confidence that they would win their bets. The results of these analyses were similar to those conducted on participants' bets; there were significant effects of both absolute and comparative feedback 402] > 31, ps < .0001). Again, as shown in Table 1 , there was a stepped effect of absolute feedback on confidence in absolute bets, and in this case no effect of absolute feedback on confidence in comparative bets. Comparative feedback influenced confidence in comparative bets, but the only condition that differed from the others was the 77 th percentile condition;
comparative feedback had no effect on confidence in absolute bets. There was no 3-way interaction, so we do not discuss the weak interaction between absolute and comparative feedback given that the effect is based on confidence collapsed across both types of bet (absolute and comparative). Despite the difference in F values, the effect size of absolute feedback in this analysis (r = .32) was not significantly different than that for comparative feedback (r = .20), p > .05.
Predicted Performance
Participants also predicted their own scores and the average person's score on the weight test, as well as their anticipated performance relative to others (on a percentile scale). Mean values on each variable appear in Table 2 . The two score estimates were included in a 3
(absolute feedback) x 3 (comparative feedback) x (2) (target: self or others) mixed-model ANOVA, with target as a within-groups factor. given no comparative feedback, they expected their performance to be equivalent to that of others.
Finally, there was a three-way interaction among target, absolute feedback, and comparative feedback (F[4, 405] = 2.57, p < .05). As seen in Table 2 , the nature of this interaction was such that the comparative feedback x target interaction described above only held in the condition where participants received no absolute feedback. When participants were told they scored a 2, they concluded that their score would be lower than that of others if they received no comparative feedback; otherwise, the pattern was the same as in the conditions where no absolute feedback was received. The greatest discrepancy occurred when participants were told they scored an 8. In this condition, participants expected both themselves and others to score highly (and to the same degree) when getting any type of comparative feedback, and they expected to outperform others when getting no comparative feedback. These findings are consistent with the solo comparison effect (Moore & Kim, 2003) ; in the absence of comparative feedback, participants inferred that they would outperform others when they had achieved a high absolute practice score and that they would earn a lower score than others when their practice score was low. However, participants did not appear to use their comparative performance to infer their own score, given that estimated scores were equivalent across all three comparative feedback conditions when absolute feedback was absent.
We then determined whether comparative and absolute feedback influenced percentile estimates, which are inherently comparative. Predictably, comparative feedback exerted a strong effect on estimated percentile score (F[2, 405] = 74.03, p < .0001), with participants estimating their percentile highest in the 77 th percentile condition, followed by participants in the nofeedback condition and then those in the 23 rd percentile condition (see Table 2 
Affective Reactions to Feedback
We created two composites to represent affective reactions to practice performance. The first reflected negative affective reactions and was composed of the items measuring anxiety and concern resulting from one's performance (α = .73). This composite originally included the item measuring disappointment, but this item was only moderately correlated with anxiety (r = .21) and reduced the reliability of the composite below acceptable levels, so this item was excluded.
The second composite represented positive affective reactions and included the items measuring pride, satisfaction, and confidence based on one's performance (α = .81). The latter item was the first item on the state self-esteem scale but was more highly related to the present items than to the items on that scale. These two composites were unrelated (r = .06, n.s.), consistent with other work suggesting that positive and negative affective variables need to be treated separately (Russell & Carroll, 1999 respectively, ps < .0001). Notably, the effect size for absolute feedback (r = .43) is significantly greater than that for comparative feedback (r = .25), p < .01. Tukey post-hoc tests showed that participants receiving an 8 were more pleased with the performance than those receiving no absolute feedback, who in turn were more pleased than those receiving a 2 (ps < .05). Thus, as is true of many of the variables reported here, the no-feedback group fell in between the two feedback groups, suggesting these participants assumed moderate performance. The effects of comparative feedback were identical; those learning their performance placed them in the 77 th percentile were more pleased than those receiving no feedback, who in turn were more pleased than those told they placed in the 23 rd percentile (ps < .05). There was also an interaction 
Task Importance
Based on the self-evaluation maintenance model (Tesser, 1988) , we should find that participants who get favorable feedback will find the task more interesting and will consider successful performance to be more personally important. We combined the interest in task and importance to self measures (r = .45, p < .01), and included them in a 3 x 3 ANOVA as before.
This analysis yielded significant main effects of both absolute and comparative feedback (Fs[2, 405] > 5.30, ps < .01), and a significant interaction (F[4, 405] = 4.43, p < .01). As predicted, participants rated interest and importance more highly when getting favorable rather than unfavorable comparative or absolute feedback. As seen in Table 2 , the pattern differed slightly for the two effects; for absolute feedback, the mean in the no feedback condition was not significantly different than the poor feedback condition (score of 2), and each was significantly lower than the good feedback condition (score of 8), ps < .05. With regard to comparative feedback, ratings in the no-feedback condition and the 77 th percentile condition were significantly greater than those in the 23 rd percentile condition. The magnitude of the effects of absolute and comparative feedback did not differ (p > .05).
Attribution
Consistent with research on self-serving attribution (Mullen & Riordan, 1988) , we expected that internal attributions for performance would be more apparent among participants who received positive feedback (either absolute or comparative). We tested this hypothesis by combining the two items assessing the perceived effects of luck (reverse-scored) and ability on performance (r = .46, p < .01) and submitting them to the same 3 x 3 ANOVA as above. Indeed, there were main effects of both absolute and comparative feedback (Fs[2, 405] = 5.44 and 3.48, respectively, ps < .05) in the expected direction. The magnitude of these effects did not differ (p > .05), and there was no interaction (F = 2.09, n.s.). Tukey post-hoc tests showed that participants were more likely to make ability attributions in the 8 condition than in the 2 condition, and in the 77 th percentile condition than in the 23 rd percentile condition (ps < .05).
The means in the no-feedback conditions fell in between these values in both cases and were not significantly different than those values.
State Self-Esteem
Twelve of the 13 items on the state self-esteem scale were collapsed (α = .73) into a composite measure (the exception was the item measuring confidence in one's ability, which was included in the earlier composite of positive affective responses). All items were coded such that higher values signified higher state self-esteem. This composite was then submitted to the same 3 x 3 ANOVA as above. As seen in Table 2 , variability was limited; most means were over 4 on a 5-point scale. Nevertheless, there was a significant effect of absolute feedback (F[2, 405] = 8.32, p < .001); a Tukey post-hoc test showed that those told they scored an 8 had higher state self-esteem than those told they scored a 2. The mean in no-feedback condition was in between these two and was not significantly different from either, ps > .05. These findings once again demonstrate the impact of absolute feedback. On the other hand, and in contrast to Klein's (1997) findings, there was no effect of comparative feedback on state self-esteem (nor an interaction, Fs < 1.8, n.s.).
Discussion
Past work in disparate areas has shown that absolute standing on a dimension may influence judgments that should be based on comparative standing (e.g., Moore & Kim, 2003) , and that comparative standing may influence judgments that should be based on absolute standing (Klein, 1997). The present study examined the magnitude of each of these effects in the same context, and did so across a range of self-evaluation, affective, and behavioral variables.
We found that absolute feedback was particularly influential across many of these variables.
When participants learned that they had achieved a very low score on the practice test, they not only predicted lower scores on the actual test but also expected to perform worse than other participants. Not surprisingly, then, they not only bet less money on the absolute task (where the outcome depended on absolute performance), but also the comparative task (where the outcome depended on comparative performance) -although only when no comparative feedback was available. When comparative feedback was available, they were less likely to rely on their absolute performance to formulate their bets. Similar patterns emerged for perceived likelihood of winning these bets, which is not surprising given that perceived likelihood was a highly significant predictor of bets. Absolute feedback influenced confidence in the absolute bet, as it should, but not confidence in the comparative bet.
Those participants who received low absolute scores also appeared higher on negative affective responses to the feedback (anxiety and concern) and lower on positive affective responses (pride, satisfaction, and confidence), as well as on state self-esteem. Such participants found the task less interesting and less personally important, and were less likely than other groups to attribute performance on this task to ability rather than luck. The no-feedback control group was sometimes significantly different than both feedback groups and other times only different than one group, but in all cases this group fell in between the group that was given a low score and the group that was given a high score. Thus, the locus of these effects seemed to occur in both feedback groups, an observation that would not have been possible without the inclusion of this no-feedback group.
Our results are consistent with recent research showing the power of absolute outcomes to drive social comparisons. For instance, even when they know it will be graded on a forced curve, students' expectations for getting an A on a test go down significantly as the test gets more difficult . When an event is highly unlikely (such as being struck by lightening or living past 100), people assume that they will be below average (Chambers et al., 2003; Kruger & Burrus, 2004) . People believe that they are below average on difficult tasks and above average on simple ones (Moore & Kim, 2003) . Note that participants in the current study did not use absolute feedback indiscriminately; on the contrary, effects of absolute feedback on comparative bets and inferences about comparative performance were muted, at least relative to absolute bets and inferences about absolute performance.
By contrast, our results suggest that the effects of comparative feedback were weaker than the effects of absolute feedback. Although comparative feedback had predictable effects on the variables it should have influenced -namely comparative bets, perceived likelihood of winning the comparative bet, and estimated percentile (which represents one's comparative standing) -it had weaker and sometimes no effects on many other variables. Comparative feedback rarely influenced absolute bets, and had no effects on perceived likelihood of or confidence in winning the absolute bets. These results are consistent with those of Klein (1997) , who found that comparative feedback was more likely to influence self-evaluative and affective variables than behavioral variables. However, in the current study, even the latter variables were not clearly affected by comparative feedback. Comparative feedback had no effect on negative affect (anxiety and concern) or on the composite self-esteem scale, which consisted mostly of negatively-valenced items. This type of feedback did influence positive reactions such as satisfaction with performance, but the effect size was significantly lower than that for absolute feedback. The only variables for which comparative feedback yielded significant effects of the same magnitude as those for absolute feedback were the measures of task interest and attribution for performance. As was true for absolute feedback, favorable comparative feedback increased task interest, self-relevance, and the perceived role of ability (vis-à-vis luck) in determining task performance, consistent with past research.
Apart from the direct contrast permitted between the effects of these two types of feedback, the crossed design also allowed for an assessment of interactions between them.
Several interesting interactions emerged. Comparative performance was more likely to influence betting and positive affect when absolute performance was low or absent. Evidently, when people perform well (in absolute terms), their comparative standing is less important to themthey are happy with their excellent performance and do not consider comparative information very important. When absolute performance was low or absent, comparative information became more influential. This represents a caveat to Festinger's (1954) theory, which argued for a uniform disinterest in social comparison when absolute information was available, irrespective of the valence of that information. For self-serving reasons, it makes sense for someone with poor performance to seek out comparative information given the possibility that if other people have also performed at a low level, the sting of the negative feedback can be lessened.
Why did absolute feedback produce much stronger and more consistent effects than comparative feedback? Prior findings suggest two clear possibilities. The first is that comparative judgments overweight information about the self, perhaps due to egocentrism (Kruger, 1999; Windschitl et al., 2003) . When people are led to focus on others, the standard effect of absolute feedback is weakened or eliminated (Moore & Kim, 2003; Windschitl et al., 2003) . Purely comparative feedback, such as the percentile rank feedback we provided our participants, weighs self and others appropriately, and is not open to egocentric weighting.
The second possibility is that when people have absolute information only about themselves, they infer estimates of others' performances that are regressive (Moore & Small, 2005) . If people have no clear expectations of performance, it might be sensible for them to assume that all possible scores are equally likely (Fox & Rottenstreich, 2003) . When they then find out that their own score was fairly extreme (either good or bad) then it makes sense for them to assume that others scores are unlikely to be as extreme. The result is that people believe that others will be better than them when they do poorly and worse than them when they do well.
This explanation is consistent with our findings regarding participants' estimates of absolute scores by self and others.
We purposely chose a task for which most people have little prior experience (guessing other people's weights) in order to maximize the import of the feedback they received.
Consequently, participants were unlikely to have prior beliefs one way or the other about their skills in the tested domain. This is exactly the situation that Festinger (1954) Weinstein & Klein, 2001; Wood, 1989) . If self-enhancement is a primary goal of social comparison, it makes sense that comparative feedback will have less impact in cases where self-relevance is low. In the current study, participants who received no comparative feedback did not believe they were better than average, suggesting that participants did not hold favorable views regarding this skill that they were motivated to protect. Instead, the task in Klein's (1997) studies concerned esthetic judgment, a skill that participants considered desirable and for which they believed they possessed above average skills. Clearly, it will be important to replicate the current findings in a context where self-relevance of the ability varies orthogonally with feedback on the associated task.
Another possibility is that our manipulation of comparative feedback was inherently weaker than our manipulation of absolute feedback. In particular, the difference between being in the 23 rd and 77 th percentile may have been perceived to be smaller than the difference between scoring a 2 or an 8 on the practice test. On the other hand, given that the comparative feedback told participants something meaningful about where their performance on an unfamiliar task stood relative to that of others, it is easy to argue that it should still have been more influential.
The absolute feedback manipulation was primarily a function of the difficulty of the test, which had been arbitrarily based on a 5-pound difference between a participant's answer and the correct weight. The task would have been substantially more difficult if that range had been 1 pound, making the scores lower, and the task would have been substantially simpler if that range had been 30 pounds. Nevertheless, absolute feedback had a more potent and consistent effect across a range of dependent variables, consistent with Festinger's (1954) original theory.
One important conclusion to be taken from the current data is that people are quite adept at distinguishing between the implications of absolute and comparative feedback. Comparative feedback yielded strong effects on comparative bets and judgments (such as estimated percentile), and little or no effect on absolute bets and judgments. Absolute feedback had much stronger effects on absolute than on comparative bets and judgments. The evidence that people are attuned to this difference suggests that past work may have exaggerated the extent to which people make inappropriate inferences from performance feedback. Such careful distinctions may be less likely in situations characteristic of high cognitive load. On the other hand, they may be more likely in cases where outcomes are highly consequential or where participants are answering questions on vague scales that make it easy to conflate comparative with absolute evaluation (Moore, 2005) . Future research needs to explore these possibilities.
The current study is the first to address the effects of absolute and comparative feedback on both absolute and comparative judgments, and in the same context. The inclusion of nofeedback groups is also a unique feature of the study, and allowed for an examination of how people respond to only one type of feedback when forced to make judgments and decisions that are associated with the other type of feedback. As a result, the various conditions we created in this experiment represent many of the feedback scenarios people face in everyday life.
Sometimes they may know their absolute standing on a dimension (e.g., running ability) and must make inferences about how they will fare in a competitive setting (e.g., a marathon). Other times they may be aware only of their comparative standing -knowing for example, that they were selected above others for a promotion at work -and must make inferences about the underlying absolute performance that put them ahead of others. In many other situations, both types of feedback are available and must be weighed accordingly. To the extent that people make these inferences carefully and rationally, decision-making will lead to favorable consequences. Research such as the study presented here will not only enhance extant theories of how people respond to feedback and engage in social comparison but also help in the development of aids to promote rational decision making. Table 1 Bets, perceived probability, and confidence in each bet, by condition 
